‘Happy Games’ at the Expense of Security?

The 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich were to be seen as a cheerful and peaceful contrast to the Nazi propaganda-laden Berlin Games of 1936. This aim was also reflected in the planning of the security concept. Optimal security with minimal regulations and a less visible police presence were the target. Consequently, it was decided to work with a civilian security service to protect the Olympic site.

Political demonstrations were forbidden through the creation of a no-go zone in the city centre. VIPs among the guests and athletes expected were to be given special protection. In addition, a restricted area by-law prohibited prostitution in the inner city area. In this way, the ‘invasion’ of criminals and sex workers that was feared could be counteracted. Known as the ‘Münchner Linie’ (Munich Line) these preventive measures fitted into the change of strategy already adopted by the Munich policeforce since the mid-1960s.

The danger of politically motivated attacks was discussed several times in advance and political extremist groups were under observation. These factors, however, were not incorporated in concrete preparatory work undertaken by the police. In view of the terrorist attack on 5 September 1972 this turned out to be a fatal mistake.

Voluntary Service for the ‘Happy Games’

In 1970 the police and the Olympic Committee had already agreed to employ a civilian security team on the Olympic site. Its members were to be unobtrusive and psychologically trained to maintain a peaceful atmosphere.

The security service wore sporty, casual clothing that fitted in with the overall visual design of the Games. During the day, the team members were unarmed and their main task was to make security checks at entrances. Their presence was to be friendly; they were to intervene in small disturbances and hand offenders over to the police, if necessary.

The security team was made up of around 1,800 members of the policeforce and the Federal Border Police who had volunteered for this duty. Most of them were recreational athletes who were exempt from their police jobs for the duration of this service.

The Olympic Village was not part of the security area covered by the police but came under the organising committee. The fact that members of a Palestinian terrorist group were able to gain access to the Olympic Village with ease on 5 September 1972, proved the concept behind the unobtrusive security service to have been a weak point with dire consequences.

Prevention Instead of Escalation

The strategic approach adopted by the Munich policeforce underwent a fundamental change in the mid-1960s. While training and operational tactics had, up until then, been strikingly military, characterised by authoritarian measures to enforce power, the ‘Schwabinger Krawalle’ (Schwabing Riots) of June 1962 marked a turning point.

After the five-day street battle between the young of Munich and the police, the excessively harsh police measures were criticised. Under Chief Constable Manfred Schreiber new operational tactics were introduced. The concept, later known as the ‘Munich Line’ focussed on de-escalation and envisaged the introduction of preventive measures at the earliest possible stage.

Many decisions made in the course of planning for the 1972 Games can be traced back to this new strategic approach. Preventive measures such as a ban on demonstrations and a restricted area by-law came into force as a consequence. A large pop-music festival project was abandoned for security reasons and stricter regulations for the ‘Spielstraße’ (Games Street) introduced. Last but not least, the idea for a civilian security service for the Olympic site resulted from this approach as well.